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Abstract
We consider an election in which each voter can collect information of diﬀerent precision.
Voters have asymmetric information and preferences that vary both in terms of ideology
and intensity. In contrast to all other models of voting with endogenous information, in
equilibrium voters collect information of diﬀerent qualities. We show that information and
abstention are not necessarily negatively correlated: some voters are more likely to abstain
the more informed they are. We also discuss the manner in which incentives to acquire
information are non-monotonic in terms of both ideology and the level of intensity.
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1 Introduction
Very few papers study endogenous information in committees. None of them study absten-
tion or roll-oﬀ. Considering that roll-oﬀ is usually explained as an informational phenomenon
(see [11]), a nexus between information acquisition and abstention seems appropriate to fully
understand the decision to vote or not. In this paper we study that nexus and answer the
question, who abstains in equilibrium?
We start with a traditional common values model of costless voting where voters’ pref-
erences are diverse and private. Our set-up is based on [1]: there is an election between two
candidates and voters’ preferences depend on two diﬀerent states of nature. In one state one
candidate is preferred to the other candidate by all voters but in the other state the latter
candidate is preferred to the former by all voters. Hence voters want to elect the "correct"
candidate in each state of nature (in this case they suﬀer no utility losses) but diﬀer on
the utility losses they suﬀer for mistaken decisions. Voters do not know the true state of
nature. Our main innovation is to allow voters to select the quality of a binary signal that
is correlated with the true state of nature. We assume that more informative signals entail
a higher cost.
We also introduce a richer set of preferences. Traditionally, preferences in committees
are modeled with a single parameter that captures the ideological bias. This parameter is
suﬃcient to understand the incentives to vote with exogenous information. But, since the
incentives to acquire information depend on the absolute level of utility losses, restricting
preferences to abstract from variation in intensity is not without loss of generality. In fact,
as we show in this paper, it matters for the study of the link between costly information
acquisition and abstention. In contrast to all other papers on voting with endogenous infor-
mation, voters collect information of diﬀerent quality in our model, and we show that it is
not necessarily true that better informed voters abstain less often.
The existence of an equilibrium with voters endogenously collecting information of dif-
ferent qualities does not follow from a straightforward application of fixed-point arguments.
We resolve this diﬃculty by transforming the problem of finding a fixed point in the space
of strategies to that of finding a fixed point in the space of "pivotal" probabilities. We then
characterize the equilibrium and proceed to study the voter’s behavior and, in particular,
the connection between information and abstention.
First, rational ignorance (making decisions without acquiring information) is driven by
two diﬀerent forces in our model. On one hand, there are voters with extreme ideology that
remain uninformed and vote accordingly that ideology. We call this group of voters "strong
supporters". On the other hand, there are some centrists voters with low intensity that
decide not to collect information and abstain. We call this group of voters "abstainers".
Second, in equilibrium, abstention takes two diﬀerent forms. On one hand, the previously
mentioned rationally ignorant voters with low intensity abstain. On the other hand, some
voters collect information and vote if the information reinforces their bias, but abstain if the
information goes against their bias. We call these voters "weak supporters". In our model
the swing voter’s curse happens for two reasons. In one case a centrist voter decides to
remain uninformed (see [11]), and in the other case, one of the signals contradicts the mild
ideological bias of a non centrist voter (see [7]).
Our model allows us to study in detail the correlation between information and absten-
tion. In particular we can answer the question; do marginally better informed voters abstain
with lower probability than marginally less informed voters? While the question of whether
informed voters show up more often than uninformed voters may be answered positively at
the aggregate level, the eﬀect of being marginally more informed depends on the voter’s ide-
ology. We show that, conditional on the state, weak supporters of the correct candidate are
more likely to vote the more informed they are but weak supporters of the other candidate
are more likely to abstain the more informed they are. The intuition behind these results
is related to the combination of ideology and information. Even though more information
always implies that the realization of the signal favoring the correct candidate is more likely
than a realization against it, the impact of this signal on voting behavior depends on the
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particular voter’s ideology. While among weak supporters of the correct candidate this signal
is more likely to confirm their ideological bias, among weak supporters of the other candidate
this signal is more likely to contradict their ideological bias. To our knowledge, this is the
first paper to study how ideology and intensity of preferences interact to aﬀect the relation
between (endogenous) information and abstention.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the literature in the next
section we present our model in Section 3. Section 4 presents the existence result and a partial
but detailed characterization. In Section 5 we discuss the importance of our assumptions
about preferences and we use the model to contribute to some empirical debates relating
fundamental voters’ characteristics and voting behavior. In particular we apply our model
to shed light on the relation between education and turnout and how partisan support aﬀects
information acquisition and abstention. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 Literature Review
Our paper is related to voting models with endogenous information1 and non-costly voting
models of abstention. We discuss each branch of the literature below.
[11] is the first paper providing an explanation for selective abstention or roll-oﬀ based
on the level of information that a voter receives exogenously. They argue that abstention
is a type of delegation that occurs when a voter is poorly informed and suﬀers the swing
voter’s curse.2 [12] extend their results by introducing heterogeneity both in preferences and
in quality of information. They provide examples where “individuals with better information
are more likely to participate than individuals with worse information...” ([12], page 382):
1[17] surveys models with information acquisition in committees.
2Abstention has also been studied as a decision theoretic problem as in [19] and [21]. [7] assume that
voters abstain because they do not gain much by switching the winner (indiﬀerence) or they do not win
much by selecting any winner (alienation). [33] allows voters to signal by abstaining, in order to aﬀect the
outcome of a second election. [2] provide evidence that the strategic behavior that leads to the swing voter’s
curse can be replicated in the lab.
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“because uninformed independents abstain and informed independents vote, the model pro-
vides an informational explanation for why better educated individuals are more likely to
vote” ([10], page 104). Both [11] and [12] place the emphasis on diﬀerential information.3
We show that when information is endogenous, the link between information and abstention
is more intricate and requires further consideration of the role of the voter’s ideological bias.
The existing literature on committee decision making with endogenous information stud-
ies cases where voters collect the same level of information in equilibrium.4 [24], [31], [13],
[26], [16], [4] and [18] assume that voters are homogenous (at least those willing to collect
information) and/or that each voter can receive an independent draw from a common dis-
tribution. [25] allows for heterogeneity and the option of acquiring information of diﬀerent
quality, but restricts the environment so that, in equilibrium, every informed voter has the
same incentives to collect information. None of these papers study abstention.
There is some evidence that information and turnout are related. [34] use survey and
aggregate data on Presidential and House races on the same ballot to show that information
and turnout are positively correlated. [6] use data from the National Research Council
regarding the quality of diﬀerent research programs and find that roll-oﬀ can be explained by
lack of information. [21] and [23] provide evidence that information and turnout are positively
correlated correcting for endogeneity of information. Assuming a very particular structure
of preferences, [27] finds that more informed voters are more likely to vote. On the other
hand [15] finds that more television exposure reduces turnout. He argues that the correlation
between information and turnout may still be positive since voters also stopped consulting
newspapers and magazines inducing a lower consumption of overall information. In this
paper we provide a theoretical argument for the negative correlation between information
and abstention.
3[28] also extends [11] by allowing for exogenous diﬀerential quality of information but restricting pref-
erence diversity significantly.
4The only exception is an example in [24] with a very particular type of heterogeneity in a two-member
committee.
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We argue that information may or may not be positively correlated with turnout at the
individual level. The previous empirical studies could not have found this correlation because
they compared aggregate measures without conditioning for ideology at the individual level
(which matters, as we demonstrate), or because they define information in a coarse way. [34],
[21], and [23] compare informed voters with uninformed voters; and [6] use three diﬀerent
levels of information quality to classify between informed and uninformed. [27] does not
control for endogenous information and uses a pure common value set up in a structural
model assuming away diﬀerences in ideology. All of these strategies lead to testing the
composition of the electorate as a whole without considering the individual voter’s behavior.
To our knowledge, the closest test regarding the eﬀect of marginal changes in information
was conducted by [30]. They found that “[in the distance utility model]...the probability of
voting for Reagan increases with information level. The opposite is true for Carter.” ([30],
page 526). As it will become clear, their finding is consistent with our model.
3 The model
There is a set N of potential voters with cardinality  who must decide between two options,
 and . There are two equally likely states of nature  ∈ { }. The winner is selected
according to the plurality rule, and if there is a tie the winner is selected by tossing a fair
coin. The set of possible actions for a voter is { ∅ } where  () is a vote for candidate
 () and ∅ stands for abstention.
There are two classes of voters: partisan and non-partisan. With probability  ∈ (0 1)
a voter  is partisan. Partisan voters are described in terms of their behavior: with probability
 ∈ (0 1), where
X
∈{∅}
 = 1, a partisan voter of type  ∈ { ∅ } casts a ballot . Note
that partisans not only support each candidate with some probability but also they abstain
with some probability. Non partisan voters have state contingent preferences described by
 = { } ∈ [0 1]2: if  is elected in state , then the voter type  = { } suﬀers
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a utility loss of  while if  is elected in state  she suﬀers a utility loss of . There is
no utility loss for selecting  in state  or  in state . Voters’ preferences are private
information. If voter  is non-partisan her preferences are conditionally independently drawn
from a distribution with a cumulative distribution function  on [0 1]2 with no mass points.
We assume further that no hyperplane of  has positive measure (hyperdiﬀuse distribution)
so if we let  () be any function we have that
Z
 (  ()) = 0.5 We assume that  ,
 and { ∅ } are common knowledge. We refer to non partisan voter ’s preferences as
her type, and to a "non-partisan voter type " simply as a "type ".
After types are privately revealed, a voter can select the precision  ∈ £1
2
 1¤ of the
information she will receive. Where  is the parameter of a Bernoulli random variable 
taking values on the set { }. We assume that signals have the same precision in both
states:  = Pr ( |  ) for  ∈ { }. Precision is costly and the precision cost is given by
 : £1
2
 1¤→ R+, where we assume that:
Assumption 1 The cost function  is twice continuously diﬀerentiable everywhere in £1
2
 1¤
and satisfies 1)  0 ()  0 and  00 ()  0 for all   1
2
, 2)  00 ¡1
2
¢ ≥  ¡1
2
¢
=  0 ¡1
2
¢
= 0, 3)
lim→1 0 ()→∞.
The set of voters (N ), the (common) distribution that characterizes these voters’ pref-
erences (  ∅   ), and the cost of information function (), constitute a commit-
tee. Since non-partisan voters decide on the precision of their signal and on how they
vote after receiving the signal, voter ’s pure strategy consist of an investment function
  : [0 1]2 → £1
2
 1¤ and a voting function   : [0 1]2×{ }→ { ∅ }, such that   ()
is the investment level of non partisan voter  with type , and   () = (  ( )    ( ))
is the ballot cast by  upon receiving the signal .6 When we refer to a generic voting func-
tion, investment function or strategy, we omit the superscripts. We say that voter  of type 
uses an informative voting function if and only if   ( ) 6=   ( ). Else, the voter is said
5We can ignore voters who are indiﬀerent between strategies, as in [5].
6 () describes the voter’s behavior and ( ) ∈ { ∅ }2 denotes arbitrary voting functions: vote
 after receiving  and vote  after receiving . We use  to refer to a particular vote.
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to use an uninformative voting function. We will identify strategies by their voting function,
implicitly assuming that the precision is optimally selected. Since precision is costly if voter
 decides to use an uninformative strategy she selects   () = 1
2
.
The timing of the game is as follows: 1) Nature draws the profile of types as well as
the state, 2) each voter  observes her own preferences, 3) non partisan voter  privately
decides whether or not to acquire information by selecting  ∈ £1
2
 1¤, 4) each voter draws a
private signal from the selected distribution parameterized by , 5) voters cast their ballots
simultaneously and, 6) the winner is elected according to the plurality rule with ties broken
by a fair coin toss.
When voter  decides how to vote she considers her eﬀect on the outcome of the election
so she must figure out the probability distribution of the diﬀerent vote counts among the
remaining voters. In order to calculate this probability distribution voter  needs to consider
the probability that a random voter casts a vote in favor of one or the other candidate.
Focusing on symmetric equilibria we have that the probability that an arbitrary voter  6= 
votes , in state , when all players but  are using the strategy ( ()   ()) is
Pr ( | ) =  + (1− )
Z
∈[01]2
X
∈{ }
I ()= Pr ( |  ()  )  () (1)
where I= = 1 iﬀ  =  and 0 otherwise. The first part of the right hand side is the
probability that a voter is partisan, multiplied by the probability that a partisan voter casts
a ballot . The second part is merely the probability that a voter is non partisan multiplied
by the probability that a non partisan voter casts the ballot .
Let ¬ () be equal to  when the state is  and equal to  when the state is ; we
denote the probability that the outcome is ¬ () in state  when voter  casts the vote 
as Pr (¬ () |  ). With this in mind we have the expected utility of voter  that casts a
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ballot  after receiving the signal  with precision  is given by
  (  |  ) = −
X
∈{}
 × Pr ((¬) |  )× Pr ( |  ) (2)
where Pr ( |  ) is the posterior beliefs about that state  after the signal  with precision
. Note that (2) is related to the incentives to vote after voter  has received the signal but
the decision to collect information depends also on the frequency with which these signals
are generated by the choice of . Let U  ( ( )) | ) be the the gross expected utility of
player  of type  and investment choice , for a voting strategy ( ):
U  ( ( )) | ) ≡
X
∈{}
  (  |  ) Pr () (3)
We study Bayesian equilibria in symmetric profiles of pure strategies.
Definition 1 A symmetric Bayesian equilibrium for the voting game is a strategy ( ∗ ()   ∗ ())
such that: 1) all voters have the same voting and investment functions:   () =  ∗ () and
  () =  ∗ () for every , 2) no type  has a profitable deviation from ( ∗ ()   ∗ ()) so7
U  ( ∗ ()   ∗ () | )−  ( ∗ ()) ≥ U  ( ( ) | )−  () (4)
Although we omit other players’ strategies in definitions Pr (¬ () |  ),   (  |  )
and U  ( ( )) | ), the reader should understand that player ’s payoﬀs depend on the
strategies used by other players.
7It is well known in statistical decision theory (see [8], page 139) that for a fixed information level
the decision problem is separable in the signals. Hence, any strategy that verifies (4) also verifies that
  ( ∗ ()   ∗ ( ) |  ) ≥   ( ∗ ()  0 |  ) for each  ∈ { }.
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4 Solving the Model
Because the best responses are complex objects, to solve the model we must take an indirect
approach. We first study voter ’s incentives to vote in favor of one or the other candidate in
section 4.1. This allows us to identify which strategies might be optimal. In the process we
discuss the incentives to abstain and how the swing voter’s curse emerges in our model. Once
we have identified which strategies can be optimal in equilibrium we proceed to determine
which strategy each type selects. For that we start by determining the maximum expected
utility that can be generated by a particular voting strategy. For those that involve no
information acquisition the problem is easy but for the informative voting strategies we have
to study how voters select the precision of the signal. That is the focus of section 4.2.
When studying the information acquisition function we show that the incentives to collect
information depend on the level of the pivotal probabilities while the incentives to vote
(after receiving the signal) depend only on the ratio of pivotal probabilities. We also discuss
how the possibility of abstaining changes the value of information and, hence, makes the
information acquisition not continuous. This discontinuity is the source of the problem to
prove existence which we solve in subsection 4.3. In that section we also present a partial,
but detailed, characterization of equilibrium. Essentially this characterization amounts to
determine which types use which strategy. The characterization is partial because it is
presented in terms of the probability of the relevant pivotal events which are endogenously
determined. Despite this drawback it is detailed enough to allow us to derive interesting
conclusions that we present in the end of that subsection and in Section 5.
4.1 Voting Incentives
In order for voter  to be willing to vote  after a signal  she needs to compare the expected
utility for this vote,   ( ∗ ()   |  ), with the induced expected utility for voting any
other way 0,   ( ∗ ()  0 |  ). Because non-partisan voters are rational they condition
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their voting choices on the event in which they are pivotal. When abstention is possible
there are many events that lead to the voter being pivotal in some sense. For example, when
the voter is considering a vote in favor of  she must focus on the events in which  is
winning by one vote (because voting  creates a tie) or there is a tie (because voting for
 makes  the winner). Note that by creating a tie she only changes the winner from 
to  50% of the time and when breaking a tie she only increases ’s chances with respect
to the original tie by 50%. Since these events have diﬀerent occurrence depending on the
actual state of nature we denote the probability that the voter actually makes  the winner
by voting for  as Pr ( | ). When comparing whether to vote for  or abstaining this
is the relevant pivotal event that the voter focus on. Similarly, when comparing a vote for
 with abstention the relevant event is  winning by one vote or a tie, and we denote the
probability of this event by Pr ( | ).
Note that we have focused on comparing a positive vote with the option of abstaining.
When comparing two positive votes, a vote for  with a vote for , there are more situations
that are relevant for this voter and it is easy to understand which are these events by
performing a double comparison. For a voter to be willing to vote for  instead of  it must
be that  leads to a lower expected utility than ∅ and, at the same time, ∅ leads to a lower
expected utility than supporting . Hence, we have that the probability of the relevant
pivotal events in comparing a vote for  with a vote for  is the sum of the probabilities
of the event in which a vote for  makes  the winner and the event in which a vote for 
makes  the winner which we denote Pr ( ∪  | ).
Now that we have described the relevant pivotal events we focus on identifying when a
voter votes for ,  or abstains. The presence of partisan voters guarantees that all pivotal
events occur with at least some probability. Using the definition of expected utility after a
particular signal (2) a necessary condition for a non-partisan voter type  to vote for  after
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receiving the signal  is


Pr ( |  )
Pr ( |  ) ≤ min {→ ∅→} (5)
where → = Pr(∪|)Pr(∪|) and ∅→ =
Pr(|)
Pr(|) are the relative probabilities of each of the
relevant pivotal events when comparing the diﬀerent voting options. A strict inequality gives
suﬃcient conditions. Let’s try to understand (5) focusing on the case where →  ∅→
so (5) is equivalent to
 × Pr ( ∪   |  ) ≤  × Pr ( ∪   |  ) (6)
The left hand side is divided in two parts:  is the loss incurred for wrongly electing  in
state , and Pr ( ∪   |  ) is the probability of electing  in state  when the voter
votes for  instead of . Then, the left hand side is the cost of switching a vote from  to .
The right hand side, on the other hand, is the expected benefits for switching a vote from 
to . Hence (5) with → simply states that the expected benefits generated by switching
a vote from  to  oﬀset the expected costs of that switch. Analogously,  Pr(|)Pr(|) ≤ ∅→
implies that the savings generated by switching from abstention to supporting  oﬀsets the
expected costs of that switch. Putting all together (5) simply states that switching a vote
from  to  and from ∅ to  generates more expected benefits than costs and, hence, a vote
for  is preferred than a vote for  or abstaining.
Analogously a necessary condition for a voter to cast a ballot in favor of  is


Pr ( |  )
Pr ( |  ) ≥ max {→ →∅} (7)
where →∅ = Pr(|)Pr(|) . Condition (7) simply states that a switch from  to  (when using
→) or from  to ∅ (when using →∅) is not desirable.
Note that if ∅→ ≥ → ≥ →∅ we have that, for every type either (5) or (7) holds
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and abstention cannot be part of the equilibrium behavior of any type. Since ∅→ ≥ →
is equivalent to → ≥ →∅ it follows that a necessary condition for abstention is that
∅→  →∅ (8)
What does this condition means? Take for example a type such that ∅→    →∅ so
we have that
 × Pr ( | )
2
−  × Pr ( | )
2
 0 (9)
 × Pr ( | )
2
−  × Pr ( | )
2
 0
On one hand,  × Pr(|)2 is the expected benefit for electing  in state  by voting for 
uninformatively while  × Pr(|)2 is the expected utility loss from wrongly electing  in
state  by voting for  uninformatively. Therefore the left hand side of the first line in (9) is
the expected net benefit of voting for  without any information. Analogously, the left hand
side of second line in (9) is the expected net benefit of uninformatively voting for . These
two conditions imply that a voter with preferences  that decides not to collect information
maximizes her expected utility by not voting for  nor . This rationally ignorant decision
to abstain is the traditional swing voter’s curse in [11].8
It is immediate to see that if  = 1
2
the set of types  that changes her vote depending
on the signal received has no mass: if a voter is willing to switch votes when the signals
are uninformative she must be indiﬀerent between the two candidates and by assumption
indiﬀerence has measure 0. Therefore, only uninformative strategies, such that the voter only
supports one candidate or abstains, and informative strategies with information collection
and voting behavior that depends on the signal need to be studied.
Recalling that a voting function is a pair ( ) ∈ { ∅}2, there are 9 possible voting
8The condition ∅→  →∅ will end up being suﬃcient once we can show that there is always some
type
¡0 0¢ with suﬃciently small 0 and 0 such that no information acquisition is optimal.
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functions. Since those strategies that involve information being used in the wrong way are
not optimal for any positive mass of players we have the following:
Lemma 1 The voting strategies , ∅ or ∅ are not optimal for almost all types.
We are left with only six strategies that may occur in equilibrium with positive proba-
bility; three of these strategies involve no information acquisition and the remaining three
strategies involve information acquisition. In principle voters can be separated into six dif-
ferent groups:  and  strong supporters (SS and SS respectively), that vote in
favor of their preferred candidate uninformatively;  and  weak supporters (WS and
WS), that support the candidate they ideologically lean to if the signal goes in favor of
that candidate and abstain otherwise; abstainers (A) who abstain uninformatively; and
independents (I) that collect information and follow the signal received. The question is
which set of voters will emerge in equilibrium and which will not be part of the equilibrium.
To finish this section we will show that if a voter behaves as an independent the level of
investment is bounded below and, if there is abstention in equilibrium, this bound is strictly
above 1
2
. The next lemma states the result formally.
Lemma 2 A necessary condition for the independent behavior to be optimal with investment
level , is µ 
1− 
¶2
≥ →∅∅→ (10)
Moreover, if there is endogenous abstention with positive probability, i.e. →∅∅→  1, inde-
pendents must invest a strictly positive amount.
Condition (10) follows by using (5) for  and (7) for  jointly. The second part is just
an application of (8) which is the swing voter’s curse. Let’s discuss the intuition by focusing
on a type with fairly balanced preferences,  ∼ , and low intensity; for example,  and
 close to 0. Since the swing voter’s curse holds and the quality of information she collects
is not enough to move her posteriors suﬃciently in any direction (her intensity is low), she
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might prefer to abstain even after receiving information. If we also consider that by deciding
not to collect any information she saves on information acquisition costs, she clearly prefers
to abstain uninformatively.
Condition (10) implies that if in equilibrium the ratio of the probabilities of the relevant
events in the diﬀerent states are such that max
∈[01]2
 ∗()
1−∗() 
q→∅
∅→ the set of independents
would be empty. In such an equilibrium, moderate voters would be abstaining and collecting
no information which contrasts with the fact that they are the ones that value information
the most. The problem is that they value information the most because they need their
posteriors to adjust the most but, given the quality of information they are willing to collect,
those posteriors do not move enough.
Before proceeding to the characterization of equilibrium we need to study the information
acquisition choice of each of the diﬀerent groups of voters.
4.2 Information acquisition
Recall that there are three relevant investment functions: one for each group that collects
information (independents and  weak supporters and  weak supporters ). Let   :
[0 1]2 → £1
2
 1¤ be the information acquisition function of a voter type  ∈ [0 1]2 planning
on using one of the informative strategies  ∈ { ∅ ∅}. Using (3) and Bayes’ rule for
each of the possible optimal strategies with investment and the information technology, we
derive the optimal investment function implicitly as:
 0 ¡ ()¢ = X
∈{}
Pr ( ∪  | )
2
(11)
 0 ¡ ∅ ()¢ = X
∈{}
Pr ( | )
2
 0 ¡∅ ()¢ = X
∈{}
Pr ( | )
2
Let’s focus on the first line of (11). The term
Pr(∪|)
2
measures the expected impact
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on the chances of  winning when a voter changes her vote from  to . Because the signal
is binary, the eﬀect of information enters linearly on the expected utility (3). It follows that
Pr(∪|)2 measures the gain from that marginal increment in ’s chances of winning
in the right state and  Pr(∪|)2 measures the gain from the marginal reduction of ’s
chances of winning in the wrong state. Then, the right hand side of each line in (11) is the
marginal benefit of increasing investment in quality of information conditional on a particular
informative voting strategy. The first order condition for the choice of quality of information
is just that the marginal benefit equates the marginal cost of information acquisition.
The first order condition (11) highlights the importance of our assumption regarding the
two dimensional preferences: the amount of information acquisition depends on the actual
levels of the utility losses. In contrast, the voting conditions (5) and (7) point out that it is
the relative ratio of utility losses what matters for all voting decisions.9
Because we assume that the marginal cost of precision is infinitely large for a perfectly
informative signal there is some upper bound strictly smaller than 1 on the maximum level
of precision for all informative voting strategies. In particular, no informed voter will ever
be perfectly informed. Comparing the first line with the second and third lines in (11)
we can see that the information acquisition function is discontinuous. This discontinuity
appears, for example, when a voter is indiﬀerent between using an informative strategy that
always calls to follow both signals and an informative strategy that involves abstention after
one signal. This is directly related to the fact that the relevant pivotal events are diﬀerent
depending on which strategy is being used. In particular a strategy that calls to follow
the signal always, making the voter switch from  to  or viceversa, takes into account
that there are more pivotal events that matter in comparison with a strategy that calls for
abstention after some signal. Abstaining after some signal reduces the value of information.
9Our two dimensional preferences assumption is similar to assuming a particular private cost function as
types. For example, let types be described now by  = + and  = 1− , and let  = 1+ . It follows
that the first line of (11) turns into  ×  0 ¡ ()¢ = X
∈{}
 Pr(∪|)2 . Types are now described
by an ideological parameter,  ∈ [0 1], and a cost parameter  ≥ 1. We thank the co-editor for pointing out
this relation.
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Since the change in the value of information is discrete, voters with very similar preferences
that decide to use diﬀerent voting functions will collect very diﬀerent qualities of information.
For example, those that are planning on abstaining after some signal collect less information
than independents despite having almost equal preferences.
4.3 Existence and Characterization
The information acquisition function is a function of the voter’s type to the interval
£
1
2
 1¤ so
finding an equilibrium among all possible information acquisition functions requires the use of
fixed point arguments in functional spaces. Usually a notion of compactness or monotonicity
is needed to show the existence of a fixed point in those spaces. Unfortunately, in our case,
neither compactness nor monotonicity are granted unless we severely restrict the information
technology10. The key to the existence result is that we can separate the types that use
each one of the strategies with cutoﬀ functions that are smooth functions of the pivotal
probabilities. At the same time, the information acquisition functions for almost every
type change smoothly as functions of the probabilities of the relevant pivotal events. Since
strategies are fully characterized by those pivotal probabilities finding a fixed point in the
space of pivotal probabilities turns out to be equivalent to finding a fixed point in the space
of strategies. This allows us to find an equilibrium by first describing it and then using its
properties to actually show that there exists at least one.
The description of equilibrium reduces to finding which types use which strategy. The
next Proposition summarizes the first result (characterization) that we discuss immediately
after. Figure 1 is particularly useful to understand the next proposition
Proposition 1 Every equilibrium is characterized by
1. 6 diﬀerent groups of voter types: strong supporters of each candidate (SS and
10The quality of information is a discontinuous mapping of the preference parameters, even among voters
who decide to collect information. The best response function is only a 0 function almost everywhere. This
precludes the application of fixed point arguments for infinite dimensional spaces (see [32], in particular, the
equicontinutity requirement in Schauder’s Fixed Point Theorem).
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SS), weak supporters of each candidate (WS and WS), abstainers (A), and
independents. (I); all groups of voter types have non empty interiors except for
independents that might be empty.
2. The voting strategy  ∗ () that verifies:  ∗ () =  for every  ∈ SS and  ∗ () =
 for every  ∈ SS;  ∗ () = ∅ for every  ∈ WS and  ∗ () = ∅ for every
 ∈WS;  ∗ () = ∅∅ for every  ∈ A; and  ∗ () =  for every  ∈ I.
3. The information acquisition function  ∗ () as defined in (11).
Although we cannot prove uniqueness of equilibrium, our partial characterization de-
scribes all symmetric Bayesian equilibria. The proof is organized in a sequence of steps.
First, in order to determine the strategies played by each type we perform pairwise com-
parisons of strategies. We construct cutoﬀs functions that determine those types that are
indiﬀerent between two strategies. The description of the types that use each strategy is
performed by partitioning the space of types using these cutoﬀ functions. For example,
when comparing the strategies ∅ and ∅∅ we define the function (∅)=(∅∅) : [0 1] → [0 1]
such that the type
¡ (∅)=(∅∅) ()¢ is indiﬀerent between using the strategy ∅, collecting
information optimally, and the strategy ∅∅. Part of the proof is showing that this can be
done in a sensible way and that it actually describes optimal behavior.
The proof continues by showing that there is abstention in equilibrium and it follows by
contradiction. Essentially, by assuming that condition (8) does not hold we have that there
is no endogenous abstention, i.e. WS, A, and WS are empty. It follows that the set
I is not empty so the average voter is in fact informed. Since some voters are informed,
conditional on the state  (), the event in which  is winning by one vote or tying is more
(less) likely than the event in which  is winning by one vote or tying; the swing voter’s
curse holds and condition (8) must hold in equilibrium. We then show that, in fact condition
(8) is suﬃcient for endogenous abstention. That is done by showing that if condition (8)
holds, then WS, A, and WS are not empty.
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Let’s discuss some salient characteristics of the equilibrium. Strong supporters are suﬃ-
ciently biased to overpower the eﬀect of the maximum amount of information that they are
willing to collect so they decide to remain uninformed. Independents and abstainers try to
treat candidates similarly. The intensity of their preferences determines whether collecting
information can help overcome any minor ideological bias they might have. Abstainers are
rationally ignorant and do not vote for any candidate, and independents collect information
to follow it.
The interesting groups are the  weak supporters and  weak supporters . They are
characterized by weakly biased preferences so they do not want to treat both candidates
similarly if they are uninformed. This implies that behaving like abstainers is not optimal.
Why are these types not behaving as independents? The maximum level of information
they are willing to collect is not enough to overpower their ideological bias when the signal
contradicts it, or acquiring information that overpowers their political bias is too costly
and it is better to collect less information and do not use it that much. In essence these
voters suﬀer the swing voter’s curse because of the combination of ideology and information
when the signal goes against their bias. So, in their case, abstention is actually driven by
information.
Equilibria takes basically three forms that can be inferred from the description of each
group of voters. A first type of equilibrium is presented in Figure 1. There we have a
situation in which strong supporters locate on the "outside" and are surrounded only by
weak supporters. Weak supporters are surrounded on the outside by strong supporters, but,
on the inside, weak supporters with high intensity are surrounded by independents, and weak
supporters with low intensity are surrounded by abstainers. Abstainers and independents
have more balanced preferences, and they are aligned along the 45 degree line according to
the intensity of preferences. Since it might be possible that behaving like independents is
not optimal for some parameters, another form of equilibrium emerges when only abstainers
are present in the 45 degree diagonal line. Figure 2 describes the third class of equilibria in
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which strong supporters share a boundary with independents. The main diﬀerence here is
that weak supporters are moderately biased while some independents are characterized by a
fairly strong bias but collect enough information to overpower it.
Figures 1 and 2 rely on certain symmetry assumptions:  and  are independent and
symmetrically distributed around 1
2
, and  =   12 . If we do not impose those symmetry
conditions, we could have one side (say those biased towards ) where strong supporters
are only surrounded by weak supporters, while the other side (biased towards ) has strong
supporters who are surrounded by both weak supporters and independents. When the elec-
torate is asymmetric, i.e. one state is more likely than the other one or the preferences are
skewed in favor of one particular candidate, the nice order presented in Figure 1 or 2 might
be lost. The question is then, what can we say in general about the ideological order of
voters and the voting strategies?
Recalling (∅)=(∅∅) : [0 1]→ [0 1], the cutoﬀ function such that all types ¡ (∅)=(∅∅) ()¢
are indiﬀerent between the strategies ∅ and ∅∅, we define (∅)=(∅∅) : [0 1]→ [0 1] as the cut-
oﬀ function for the strategies ∅ and ∅∅. In the Appendix we show that if   (∅)=(∅∅) ()
the type ( ) prefers the strategy ∅∅ to the strategy ∅ and if   (∅)=(∅∅) () the type
( ) prefers the strategy ∅∅ to the strategy∅. With these function in mind, and consider-
ing that independents collect a strictly positive amount of information (see Lemma 2), for low
values of  and  we have that abstainers exist because (∅)=(∅∅) ()    (∅)=(∅∅) ()
for some . For suﬃciently low intensity, the separation of types close to the origin is given
by the cutoﬀ function between  strong supporters and  weak supporters, the cutoﬀ func-
tion between  weak supporters and abstainers, and the respective cutoﬀ functions for 
supporters. Then
Proposition 2 In any equilibrium there is some   0 such that for every type that verifies
 +  ≤  the group of voters are ordered clockwise in the following way: SS, WS, A,
WS and SS.
The fact that voters are ordered in this way implies that the quality of information is
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Revision/Figure 1.tif
Figure 1: Strong supporters are in red, weak supporters in yellow, independents in light blue and abstainers
in dark blue. The losses  and  are beta random variables with parameters (2 2) and the committee
consists of 4 ( = 4) members that are partisan with 10% probability ( = 01) and are evenly split between
the voting options ( =  = ∅ = 13). The cost function is  () = 4
¡− 12¢3.
not monotonic in ideology for low intensity. First of all, let’s concentrate on types with the
same level of intensity; say  +  =  and assume that  is suﬃciently low so types are
ordered like in Proposition 2. Consider the case in Figure 1 starting from  = 0 and  = 
and increasing  down the “isointensity” line +  = . Information is nil when the voter
is a  strong supporter, grows when the voter is a  weak supporter, and is nil again when
the voter becomes abstainer; then information is positive when the voter becomes a  weak
supporter to be nil again when the voter is a  strong supporter. Note that centrist voters
are those that value the information the most but, when their intensity is low, their posteriors
do not change much after any signal and saving on information acquisition is optimal, so
they decide to remain uninformed and abstain. On the other hand if  is suﬃciently large
we could move from  weak supporters to independents and then to  weak supporters.
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Revision/Figure 2.tif
Figure 2: Strong supporters are in red, weak supporters in yellow, independents in light blue and abstainers
in dark blue. The losses  and  are beta random variables with parameters (1 2) and the committee
consists of 3 ( = 3) members that are partisan with 10% probability ( = 01) and are evenly split between
the voting options ( =  = ∅ = 13). The cost function is  () = 2
¡− 12¢4. The size of abstainers is
significantly small.
We can argue that more centrist voters will collect more information. In this case, centrist
voters scape the swing voter’s curse by collecting high quality information that shifts their
posteriors enough.
We are ready now to prove existence. The arguments are in line with the discussion at
the beginning of the section: a best response in our voting game is fully captured by the
pivotal probabilities, so finding a fixed point in the space of pivotal probabilities is finding
an equilibrium in the voting game.
Proposition 3 There exists a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium.
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5 Applications
5.1 Some comparative statics
Information and abstention in the limit The "parameters" of the cutoﬀ functions 
are endogenous variables so we have only provided a partial characterization of equilibrium.
Comparative statics analysis turns out to be significantly diﬃcult since we require a complete
and full characterization of equilibrium. In this section we take a short cut and discuss
properties of the equilibrium when the number of voters is large. In particular we focus
on the following questions, what is the ideology of the voters that collect information, and
what is the ideology of the voters that abstain? Unlike [11] and [12], in our model no non-
partisan voter abstains when the electorate becomes large. The intuition hinges on the fact
that investment in information is small in the limit so the eﬀect of the swing voter’s curse
disappears. The smaller the quantity of information collected by the average player, the
more a player relies on her own private ideological bias so the less willing she is to abstain.
As a consequence weak supporters and abstainers disappear when  is large.
Proposition 4 When the electorate is suﬃciently large,  ()→ 1
2
for all  ∈ [0 1] and the
probability of a non partisan voter abstaining goes to 0.
Contrasts this, for example, with [27] where, even though there is a large number of voters,
some positive mass of voters use the information and some positive mass of voters abstain.
His result relies on the fact that voters exogenously receive information and those that are
better informed want to vote while those that are less informed prefer to abstain. Our paper
points out that, those results (positive abstention and positive amount of information used
in equilibrium by the average voter) are directly related to the assumption about exogenous
information in costless models of voting.
Changes in partisan support Elections of House Representatives, Senators and Gover-
nors are usually a particular state aﬀair. Each state might have a diﬀerent distribution of
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registered republicans and democrats (partisan voters). The level of abstention and the level
of information of the average voter also diﬀers from state to state. How does the distribution
of partisan support aﬀect the voters’ willingness to collect information and abstain? In par-
ticular, we now focus on identifying how the set of voters using diﬀerent strategies changes
when the number of voters is large. This exercise links the presence of partisan voters with
the response of non- partisan voters in electorates that are suﬃciently large.
Lemma 3 When the electorate is suﬃciently large the set of  strong supporters verifies
Z
∈SS
 ()  ≈ 1
2
+ (− − )
2
(12)
For a suﬃciently large number of voters the proportion of votes in favor of one or the
other candidate is close to being evenly split. Moreover, (12) shows that strong supporters
compensate for the bias introduced by partisan voters. For example, when  increases
(while  is constant, which means less partisan abstention), the set of  strong supporters
decreases. In terms of Figures 1 and 2, increments in  induce a clockwise shift. This implies
that for a suﬃciently large number of voters, the higher the partisan vote in favor of , the
more ideologically biased toward that candidate are the voters who collect information.
Note that an increment on the proportion of non partisan voters () has a diﬀerential
eﬀect depending on the proportion of each candidate non partisan supporters. Assume the
case   . Then increasing , increases the probability of a vote for  by a partisan voter
more than what it increases the probability of a vote for  by a partisan voter. As we had
before, the set of  strong supporters grows, while the set of  strong supporters shrinks;
and, again we have a clockwise shift in Figures 1 and 2 so voters that are leaning towards 
are the ones that are more likely to collect information. The opposite happens if   .
To sum up, a change in the electorate that raises the proportion of partisan voters who
support candidate  with respect to the proportion of partisan voters that support candidate
, implies that the non partisan voters who are closer ideologically to candidate  will be
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the voters that actually collect information in equilibrium. And this, in turns, implies
that voters that are closer to candidate  ideologically are also those who might decide to
abstain. Consequently, the ideology of independent voters and abstainers is directly related
to the relative proportions of partisan voters and who collects information depends on which
candidate has more partisan support. A testable implication of this paper is that the more
partisan support for one candidate, the more biased towards that candidate are those that
collect information and potentially abstain. To our knowledge we are the first ones to uncover
this relation.
5.2 The role of flexible preferences
In the model presented here, preferences are described by two parameters. It is traditional in
voting models to assume that utility losses are perfectly and inversely correlated (+ = 1
for all ).11 This assumption is suﬃcient to describe the voting strategy after information has
been collected, as can be seen in expressions (5) and (7). On the other hand, the expressions
in (11) show that the absolute levels of these losses are relevant in terms of information
acquisition. We now illustrate why allowing for flexible preferences matters theoretically
when information is endogenous. Essentially, restricting preferences diminishes the model’s
capacity of properly capturing abstention as a social phenomenon.
Assume now that preferences are described by restricting  +  = 1 for all  and thatb is the prior distribution of types  ∈ [0 1]; a slight modification of Propositions 1 and 3
allows us to use the same results obtained in the previous sections to study this restricted
model using now cutoﬀ types instead of cutoﬀ functions.12 Let  be defined as the lower
11Assumptions presenting heterogeneity as  −  =  ∈ [−1 1] or 


 =  ∈ [0∞] suﬀer the same
drawback presented here.
12Proposition (3) uses the hyperdifuse assumption to assure that no mass of types is concentrated on any
of the cutoﬀs functions. This allows for a simple integration over types to capture the probability of a giving
vote and makes each set of voters "smooth" with respect to changes in the "pivotal" probabilities. When we
reduce the dimension of the space of types, assuming that b has no mass points is suﬃcient to assure that
cutoﬀ types have no mass. The key to this extension is realizing that existence follows by a fixed point in
the space of pivotal probabilities and not in the space of best responses per se.
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investment possible by independents in Lemma 2:

1− =
q→∅
∅→ .
Under symmetric conditions13 we have that every informed independent actually collects
the same amount of information. This happens because under symmetry the equilibrium
probability of  winning (losing) by one vote in state  is the same as the equilibrium
probability of  winning (losing) by one vote in state , and the equilibrium probability of
a tie is the same in both states; it follows that
Pr(∪|)
2
=
Pr(∪|)
2
=  and (11)
yields  0 ¡ ()¢ = .14 If, for a given electorate size, we have that  0 ¡¢ ≤  then  ≤
 () and all voters that have fairly balanced preferences will decide to collect information
 () and follow the signal. In this case no abstainers emerge in equilibrium. We could
have concluded that abstention by uninformed voters is not an equilibrium phenomenon.15
If, on the other hand for a given electorate  0 ¡¢   we must have that all moderate voters
do not want to collect information and independents are not present in equilibrium. Because
only weak supporters are actually collecting information, we could have concluded that only
"intermediate levels" of ideology collect information as in [22].
5.3 The correlation between information and abstention
It is well documented that education aﬀects turnout (see [29] and references there) but there
is more disagreement regarding the mechanism by which they are related. [14] finds that
education is correlated with political knowledge while [20] finds that education provides the
information processing ability to collect and understand political information. In turns,
this ability is the one that creates the relation between education and abstention (see also
[3] for a similar argument). Note that these arguments rely on the fact that education
is related to information, and information is then related to the desire to vote.16 In this
13Essentially that  () is symmetric around 12 and  =   12 .
14Details can be provided upon request.
15Moreover, if the equilibrium pivotal probabilities that emerge in Figure 2 are also equilibrium pivotal
probabilities of the game with restricted preferences no voter in the counterdiagonal abstains. In this case,
we would have concluded that abstention is not an equilibrium phenomenon!!!
16For an argument that does not link education and turnout via information see [29] who argue that
educated people tend to register more and this is what drives the relation between education and turnout.
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subsection we illustrate how our model contributes to this debate. Essentially, the particular
distribution of voters’ ideology aﬀects the aggregate correlation between information and
abstention and, hence, also aﬀects the estimation of the eﬀect of education on abstention.
To our knowledge, no empirical work has incorporated the particular ideology in capturing
the eﬀect of education on turnout and, hence, has potentially underestimated the eﬀect of
education.17
Let Pr ( 6= ∅ |  )be the probability of voting conditional on the quality of the infor-
mation  and on the state . It is obvious that Pr( 6=∅|) = 0 for all those who strictly
prefer to be uninformed ( strong supporters,  strong supporters and abstainers) as well
as for those who behave as independents. On the other hand, in state  turnout of  weak
supporters is positively correlated with information while turnout of  weak supporters is
negatively correlated with information. In state , of course, the correlation between infor-
mation and turnout goes in the opposite direction for weak supporters. This implies that, at
the aggregate level, the correlation between information and turnout depends on the relative
size of the sets of  weak supporters and  weak supporters.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we present a voting model with abstention and endogenous information acqui-
sition using two interdependent innovations: first, committee members’ preferences diﬀer on
the levels of both ideology and intensity, and, second, voters select the precision of the signal
they receive. The combination of these two features leads to voters collecting information of
diﬀerent qualities in equilibrium. Understanding the role of information on voting requires
characterizing who collects information, how much information is collected, and how this
information is used. While variation in the ideological dimension is enough to show that rel-
[20] also recognizes this eﬀect.
17Although focusing on the impact of media bias, [9], find that the availability of independent TV channels
decreases turnout in Russia. They do control for initial ideology in calculating the eﬀect of vote choice. They
attribute the turnout eﬀect to negative campaigning.
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atively centrist voters acquire information,18 diﬀerences in intensity give raise to interesting
eﬀects on the level of information that is acquired and on how this information aﬀects voting
behavior.
We show that information acquisition is not monotonic in ideology or intensity. More-
over, the optimal information acquisition function is discontinuous even among voters who
collect some information. This suggests that the link between fundamental characteristics of
voters and information acquisition is more intricate than previously thought. For example,
if we associate education with higher levels of concern (or its analogous, lower costs for infor-
mation acquisition), a voter with relatively pronounced ideological preferences might collect
significantly less information than another voter with the same educational level but more
moderate ideological preferences.
We also show that in order to find a clear pattern between information and abstention
we need to focus the analysis on voters with similar ideological bias: some voters with a
mild bias in favor of one candidate are more likely to vote the more informed they are, while
other voters with a mild bias in favor of the other candidate are more likely to abstain the
more informed they are. In our more general model, some voters abstain even if they have
much at stake in the election and have relatively strong evidence in favor of one candidate.
Abstention is not simply the result of poor information, but of a more complex interaction
between preferences and information.
We provide a novel test of the relation between information and abstention. In particular
or model predicts a stark contrast on the way information aﬀects turnout between opposing
ideologies. For example, those leaning towards the winner that decided to abstain despite
having collected information should be on average less informed than those leaning towards
the loser that decided to abstain. We also provide a novel prediction about the correlation
between partisan support and the ideology of those that collect information. In our model
the ideology of informed voters is positively correlated with the relative weights of partisan
18See [25] and [21] for two models with restricted preferences that generate diﬀerent predictions about
who collects information.
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support: the more right leaning an electorate is the more right leaning the ideology of
informed voters.
We finish by discussing a particular application of the model. For example, in a presiden-
tial race candidates need to decide which topics to discuss during the campaign, considering
how much eﬀort the voters are willing to exert in understanding the message. If there is
high variance on the preferences of non partisan voters, a relatively polarized electorate, a
political campaign that provides detailed information might not be optimal. This is because
getting the message requires a level of eﬀort from the voters that, on average, they are not
willing to exert. On the other hand, simple slogans with half but fast truths might be more
eﬀective. Note also that this strategy will aﬀect turnout but will not swing voters since it
targets weak supporters. In contrast, when the electorate is less polarized, voters are more
willing to process information and issues can be discussed in more depth. This strategy
mostly swing voters that are deeply concern with the outcome of the election since it tar-
gets independents. A fully developed model of the political campaign game between two
candidates is left for future research.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 We prove the case ∅; the cases ∅ and  are analogous. If a non
partisan voter uses ∅, (5) and (7) give that
Pr ( |  )
Pr ( |  ) ≤

 min {→ ∅→}
≤  max {→ →∅} ≤
Pr ( |  )
Pr ( |  )
which is a contradiction since   1
2
. If  = 1
2
, it is optimal only for types that satisfy

 = min {→ ∅→} = max {→ →∅}.
Proof of Lemma 2 If →∅  ∅→, a voter that is willing to follow the signal after
every realization must verify, condition (5) for  and (7) for . Hence it must be that

1−
 ≤ ∅→ and  1− ≥ →∅, and together give the condition (10). Recalling that, as
discussed in the main text, a necessary condition for abstention is
→∅  →  ∅→ (13)
so it follows that (10) implies
³ 
1−
´2  1 and,   1
2
is necessary.
Proof of Proposition 1
Cutoﬀ functions In order to describe the equilibrium we need to define the cutoﬀ
functions discussed in the text.
Let ∆U  ¡()  ¡00¢ |  ¢ be the diﬀerence between the utility derived from using and the utility from using the strategy 00 and acquiring information optimally for
each strategy which is:
U  (  ()   | )−  (  ())−
³
U 
³
 00 ()  00 | 
´
− 
³
 00 ()
´´
(14)
We define the function ()=(00) () such that the type  =
³
()=(00) ()  
´
is
indiﬀerent between using the strategy () and the strategy ¡00¢; implicitly we define the
cutoﬀ functions by the condition ∆U 
³
()  ¡00¢ | ()=(00) ()  ´ = 0. In some
cases we cannot assure that  exists so we need to work with a function that maps mistakes
in state  to mistakes in state . In such cases we are going to use the letter  and define it
implicitly as ∆U 
³
()  ¡00¢ |  ()=(00) ()´ = 0.
Although  and  are functions of every voter’s strategy, the eﬀect of every voter except 
is aggregated via the pivotal probabilities. Both arguments are omitted in order to simplify
notation. Second, these functions are defined beyond [0 1]2. Third, for the cutoﬀ function
between independents and abstainers, we cannot show that ()=(∅∅) () or ()=(∅∅) ()
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always exists. Nevertheless, we can show that, at least one of them exists. Moreover, for
every pair  and  that is well defined, we can show that  = −1.19 Finally, contrary to all
other cases, it may be that ()=(∅∅) ()  1 (or ()=(∅∅) ()  1) for all  ∈ [0 1]2. In
that case, being an abstainer is always better than being independent.
The next Remarks are useful to define each one of the sets of voters. The proofs are
provided immediately below the statements.
Remark 1 ()=(∅) ()  (∅)=(∅∅) () for every   0
Let L () =  0 ()− () and using (3), (11) and (14) we have that (∅)=(∅∅) () and
()=(∅) () are respectively defined as
L ¡ (∅) ¡(∅)=(∅∅) ()  ¢¢
(∅)=(∅∅) () ≡
Pr ( | )
2
(15)
L ¡ (∅) ¡()=(∅) ()  ¢¢
 ≡
Pr ( | )
2
(16)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (15) and (16) it follows that (∅)=(∅∅) () is
increasing and strictly convex and (∅)=() () is increasing and strictly concave. Using
properties of convex and concave functions we have that 
(∅)=(∅∅)()
  ∅→  
()=(∅)()
 .
Remark 2 (∅)=(∅∅) ()  (∅)=() () for every   0
It follows the same line used in Remark 1.
Remark 3 (∅)=() ()  (∅)=(∅∅) () for every   0 where (∅)=() () verifies¡(∅)=()¢−1 = (∅)=()
Let the pair
³e e´ be such that e = (∅)=(∅∅) ³e´ so (3), (11), (14) and the definition
of L () give that
L
³
∅
³e e´´e = Pr ( | )2 (17)
Using again (3), (11), and (14) we have that the type
³e e´ prefers () to (∅) if
L
³

³e e´´− L³ ∅ ³e e´´e ≥ Pr ( | )2 (18)
Using the second line of (11) we have that the condition (18) is equivalent to
ePr ( | )
2
+ 
³

³e e´´−  ³ ∅ ³e e´´
≤  0
³
 ∅
³e e´´³ ³e e´−  ∅ ³e e´´+  0 ³∅ ³e e´´ ³e e´
19In particular we use that (∅)=() ¡(∅)=() ()¢ = .
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Using now that e = (∅)=(∅∅) ³e´ verifies (17), and the second line of (11), we have that
the type
³e e´ prefers () to (∅) if
 0
³

³e e´´³ ³e e´− ∅ ³e e´´ (19)
≥ 
³

³e e´´−  ³ ∅ ³e e´´−  ³∅ ³e e´´
−  0
³
 ∅
³e e´´³∅ ³e e´−  ∅ ³e e´´
or
 0
³

³e e´´³ ³e e´−  ∅ ³e e´´ (20)
≥ 
³

³e e´´−  ³ ∅ ³e e´´−  ³∅ ³e e´´
−  0
³
∅
³e e´´³ ∅ ³e e´− ∅ ³e e´´
Note that if ∅
³e e´   ∅ ³e e´ condition (19) gives that it is suﬃcient if
−
³
 ∅
³e e´´ ≤  ³∅ ³e e´´−  ³ ³e e´´
+  0
³

³e e´´³ ³e e´− ∅ ³e e´´
and if ∅
³e e´ ≤  ∅ ³e e´ condition (20) implies that it is suﬃcient if
−
³
∅
³e e´´ ≤  ³ ∅ ³e e´´−  ³ ³e e´´
+  0
³

³e e´´³ ³e e´−  ∅ ³e e´´
Convexity of  gives that the right hand side of the previous two conditions is always positive
so if the type
³e e´ verifies e = (∅)=(∅∅) ³e´ we must have that ³e e´ prefers  to
∅ which implies e ≥ (∅)=() ³e´ by definition of (∅)=() ().
Remark 4 If (∅)=() () 6= ()=(∅) () for some  6= 0 then
(∅)=() ()  ()=() ()  ()=(∅) () or
()=(∅) ()  ()=() ()  (∅)=() ()
Moreover, 1) if →∅ ≤ ∅→ then the first line holds for any   0, and 2) if →∅  ∅→
then the second line holds for suﬃciently small .
Assume first that (∅)=() () ≤ ()=(∅) () so every type with  = (∅)=() ()
weakly prefers ∅ to  and strictly prefers  to ∅ so it must be that  is strictly
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prefer to  which implies that   ()=() () or, by assumption, (∅)=() () 
()=() (). Now take  = ()=() (), so  is weakly preferred to , and since
(∅)=() ()   we must have that  is preferred to ∅ and, therefore,  is preferred
to ∅ which implies that   ()=(∅) (), and therefore ()=() ()  ()=(∅) ().
This proves the first line. The second line follows by assuming that (∅)=() () 
()=(∅) () and using the same arguments.
For last part we have that it is suﬃcient if (∅)=() ()  ()=() () when →∅ ≤
→ ≤ ∅→. Using (18) we have that every type with e = (∅)=() ³e´ verifies
ePr ( | )
2

³e e´− ePr ( | )
2
³
1− 
³e e´´ (21)
= 
³

³e e´´−  ³ ∅ ³e e´´
−  0
³
 ∅
³e e´´³ ³e e´−  ∅ ³e e´´
By concavity of  and the fact that  ∅
³e e´   ³e e´ we have that the right hand
side of (21) is negative
ee  →∅
³
1− 
³e e´´

³e e´ ≤ →
³
1− 
³e e´´

³e e´ (22)
where the inequality on the right follows by assumption of →∅ ≤ →. Using now (3),
(11) and (14) we have that ()=() () is defined as
Pr ( ∪  | )
2
= L ¡ ¡()=() ()  ¢¢ (23)
which implies that ()=() () is strictly concave with
()=() ()
 = →
1−  ¡()=() ()  ¢
 (()=() ()  ) (24)
Using properties of concave functions we have that 
()=()()
  →
1−(()=()())
(()=()())
which implies that, for the type that verifies e = (∅)=() ³e´ using the condition (22):
()=()()

(()=()())
1−(()=()()) 


( )
1−( ) . Note now that


()
1−() is increasing
in  which implies that ()=()
³e´  e = (∅)=() ³e´.
Finally, note that (21) implies that
(∅)=()
³e´
e =
Pr(∪|)
2
³
1− 
³e e´´− Pr(|)2 ³1−  ∅ ³e e´´
Pr(∪|)
2

³e e´− Pr(|)2  ∅ ³e e´
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so when e → 0 we have that (∅)=()() → →∅ while ()=()() → →; then if
→∅  →  ∅→ we must have then (∅)=()
³e´  ()=() () for suﬃciently
small .
Remark 5 If →∅ ≤ ∅→ then (∅)=(∅∅) () ≥ (∅)=(∅∅) () and if →∅  ∅→ then
there is some  suﬃciently small such that (∅)=(∅∅) ()  (∅)=(∅∅) ().
Note that (16) gives ∅→ 
(∅)((∅)=(∅∅)())
1− (∅)((∅)=(∅∅)()) ≡
(∅)=(∅∅)()
 and (17) gives
(∅)=(∅∅)()
 =
→∅ 1−
∅((∅)=(∅∅)())
∅((∅)=(∅∅)()) which implies that  → 0 we must have
(∅)=(∅∅)()
 → ∅→ and
(∅)=(∅∅)()
 → →∅. Using that (∅)=(∅∅) ()→ 0 and (∅)=(∅∅) ()→ 0 when  → 0, if→∅  ∅→ there is some  suﬃciently small such that (∅)=(∅∅) ()  (∅)=(∅∅) ().
We are now ready to provide the proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Using the cutoﬀ functions described previously let’s first define the following group
of voters.20 The set of strong supporters of each candidate are defined by
SS ≡ © ∈ [0 1]2 :  ≤ min©()=(∅) ()  ()=() ()ªª (25)
SS ≡ © ∈ [0 1]2 :  ≥ max©()=(∅) ()  ()=() ()ªª
The sets of weak supporters are defined as21:
WS ≡ © ∈ [0 1]2 : ()=(∅) ()   ≤ (∅)=(∅∅) ()   ≥ (∅)=() ()ª (26)
WS ≡ © ∈ [0 1]2 : (∅)=(∅∅) () ≤   ()=(∅) ()   ≤ (∅)=() ()ª
The case of independents and abstainers involves the function ()=(∅∅) () or ()=(∅∅) ()
depending on which one is properly defined. If ()=(∅∅) () is well defined, the set of
abstainers is
A ≡
½
 ∈ [0 1]2 :
∙  ≤ ()=(∅∅) ()
 (∅)=(∅∅) ()    (∅)=(∅∅) ()
¸¾
(27)
while if ()=(∅∅) () is well defined, the set of abstainers is
A ≡
½
 ∈ [0 1]2 :
∙  ≤ ()=(∅∅) ()
 (∅)=(∅∅) ()    (∅)=(∅∅) ()
¸¾
(28)
Independents are obviously defined as the complement of all these groups in [0 1]2.
The first part of the characterization involves showing that the reduced set of cutoﬀ
functions that describe each one of these sets are necessary and suﬃcient. We focus on the
20Since its measure is zero we can assign types that are indiﬀerent to any of the groups that provide the
same expected utility.
21Strictly speaking (∅)=() () is not necessary since the function (∅)=() () is well defined. We
provide that representation in order to maintain the symmetric structure.
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sets of  weak supporters (WS), abstainers (A), and  strong supporters (SS). For
these sets be check that voters are maximizing expected utility by selecting those strategies
and using the optimal information. The sets of  strong supporters (SS) and  weak
supporters (WS) can be analyzed by reversing the order of  and  and the signals  and
 in the analysis. Finally the set of independents (I) can be defined as the complement of
the remaining sets of voters.
WS is well defined by (26)
Using Remarks 2 and 3 we have (∅)=() ()  (∅)=(∅∅) ()  (∅)=() () so if
 ≤ (∅)=() (), the strategy ∅ is preferred to the strategy  and the strategy ∅∅ is
preferred to the strategies ∅ and . Now using that if  ≤ (∅)=(∅∅) (), the strategy ∅
is preferred to the strategy ∅∅, and by the previous line it is also preferred to the strategies
∅ and . Finally, if   ()=(∅) (), the strategy ∅ is preferred to the strategy .
Using now Remark 4 we have that →∅ ≤ → ≤ ∅→ implies (∅)=() () ≤
()=(∅) () so the set © ∈ [0 1]2 : ()=(∅) ()   ≤ (∅)=(∅∅) ()ª = ∅ which implies
that WS = ∅. On the other hand, Remark 4 and the fact that  is the mnemonic for the
inverse of , we have that →∅  →  ∅→, implies that for suﬃciently small ,
(∅)=() ()  ()=() ()  ()=(∅) () and WS 6= ∅.
A is well defined by (27) and (28)
We want to show that the set of abstainers defined either as in (27) or in (28) is well
defined whenever ()=(∅∅) () and/or ()=(∅∅) () are well defined.
It is immediate to see that (∅)=(∅∅) ()    (∅)=(∅∅) () implies that ∅∅ is preferred
to any strategy followed by a weak supporter. Remark 1 which implies (∅)=(∅∅) () 
()=(∅) () and Remark 2 which implies (∅)=(∅∅) ()  (∅)=() () we have that
()=(∅) ()    (∅)=() () implies that ∅ is preferred to  and ∅ is preferred
to , so using the previous argument we have that ∅∅ is preferred to any strategy followed
by a strong supporter.
Using Remark 5 we have that if →∅ ≤ ∅→ then A = ∅ and if →∅  ∅→ we
need to show that that abstaining without information is preferred to voting following the
signal. First we are going to prove that the cutoﬀ functions are well defined so the sets can
be properly defined. Using (3), (11), (14), and the function L we define ()=(∅∅) () and
()=(∅∅) (), whenever possible, as
L ¡ ¡()=(∅∅) ()  ¢¢ = ()=(∅∅) () Pr ( | )
2
+ Pr ( | )
2
(29)
L ¡ ¡ ()=(∅∅) ()¢¢ = Pr ( | )
2
+ ()=(∅∅) () Pr ( | )
2
and using the implicit function theorem we have that ()=(∅∅) () is well defined when
Pr(|)
Pr(∪|) 6= 
¡()=(∅∅) ()  ¢ and ()=(∅∅) () is well defined when Pr(|)Pr(∪|) 6=
1−  ¡ ()=(∅∅) ()¢.
First note that if the left hand side of any of the equations in (29) is bigger than the right
hand side, we have that the strategy  is preferred to ∅∅. Assume that ∅∅ is indiﬀerent to
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 so we must have the first line of (29) is equivalent to


Pr ( ∪  | )
Pr ( ∪  | )
µ
 ( )− Pr ( | )
Pr ( ∪  | )
¶
=
µ¡
1−  ( )¢− Pr ( | )
Pr ( ∪  | )
¶
+  ¡ ( )¢
Assume that ( ) verifies that  ( ) ≤ Pr(|)Pr(∪|) so we must have that


Pr ( ∪  | )
Pr ( ∪  | )
µ
 ( )− Pr ( | )
Pr ( ∪  | )
¶

µ¡
1−  ( )¢− Pr ( | )
Pr ( ∪  | )
¶
Recalling that (5), (7) and →∅  ∅→ imply that ∅→    →∅ is necessary for
abstention we have that
 ( ) 
Pr(∪|)
Pr(∪|)
Pr(|)
Pr(|) +
Pr(∪|)
Pr(∪|)
(30)
∅→
→
µ
 ( )− Pr ( | )
Pr ( ∪  | )
¶

µ¡
1−  ( )¢− Pr ( | )
Pr ( ∪  | )
¶
where the second line follows since we assume  ( )− Pr(|)Pr(∪|) ≤ 0. Using again
the assumption that  ( ) ≤ Pr(|)Pr(∪|) we have that (30) implies that
Pr ( | )
Pr ( ∪  | ) +
Pr ( | )
Pr ( ∪  | )  1
Therefore, if Pr(|)
Pr(∪|) ≤
Pr(|)
Pr(∪|) every type that it is indiﬀerent between ∅∅ and
 verifies that  ( )  Pr(|)Pr(∪|) whenever →∅  ∅→. Now assume that
Pr(|)
Pr(∪|) +
Pr(|)
Pr(∪|)  1 and we have that the first line of (30) implies that
−∅→→
µ
1−  ( )− Pr ( | )
Pr ( ∪  | )
¶

µ
1−  ( )− Pr ( | )
Pr ( ∪  | )
¶
so we must have that
¡
1−  ( )¢  Pr(|)Pr(∪|) .
Recalling that ()=(∅∅) () is well defined when Pr(|)Pr(∪|) 6= 
¡()=(∅∅) ()  ¢
and ()=(∅∅) () is well defined when Pr(|)Pr(∪|) 6= 1−
¡ ()=(∅∅) ()¢ we have
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that Pr(|)
Pr(∪|) +
Pr(|)
Pr(∪|) ≤ 1 is suﬃcient to apply the implicit function theorem
for ()=(∅∅) () and Pr(|)Pr(∪|) +
Pr(|)
Pr(∪|)  1 is suﬃcient to apply the implicit
function theorem for ()=(∅∅) ().
To finish the proof that →∅  ∅→ is suﬃcient for A to be non empty we use that, 1)
Lemma 2 gives that when →∅  ∅→ there is a suﬃcient small  such that ∅∅ is preferred
to being independent, and 2) Remark 5 gives that →∅  ∅→ there is a suﬃcient small
 such that (∅)=(∅∅) ()  (∅)=(∅∅) ().
SS is well defined by (25)
We divide the proof in two: the case →∅ ≤ ∅→ and ∅→  →∅.
Using Remark 4 we have that when →∅ ≤ → ≤ ∅→ the only relevant comparison
is between  and  since ∅ is not going to be used in equilibrium. In terms of the
cutoﬀs functions by Remark 4 we have that ()=() () ≤ ()=(∅) () which implies
that SS ≡ © ∈ [0 1]2 :  ≤ ()=() ()ª.
We focus now on the second case, ∅→  →∅. Since ∆U(()(∅)| )  0, if  
()=(∅) () the strategy  is preferred to the strategy (∅). On the other hand, since
∆U((∅)(∅∅)| )
  0, if   (∅)=(∅∅) () the strategy (∅) is preferred to the strategy
(∅∅). Using Remark 1 if a type prefers  to the strategy ∅ (  ()=(∅) ()) that type
also prefers the strategy  to the strategy ∅∅. It is easy to see that ∆U(()()| )  0
so if   ()=() () the strategy  is preferred to the strategy . Putting all
together a type that verifies   min©()=() ()  ()=(∅) ()ª prefers the strategy
 to , ∅ and ∅∅.
Since ∆U
((∅∅)(∅)| )
  0, if   (∅)=(∅∅) (), the strategy ∅∅ is preferred to the
strategy ∅. On the other hand, since ∆U((∅)()| )  0, if   (∅)=() () the
strategy ∅ is preferred to the strategy . Using Remark 2 we have that a if  
(∅)=(∅∅) () then a type that prefers ∅∅ to the strategy ∅ also prefers the strategy ∅∅ to
the strategy .
By Remark 4 we have that ∅→  →∅ implies that ()=(∅) ()  ()=() () 
(∅)=() () and by Remark 3 we have that (∅)=() ()  (∅)=(∅∅) (). The previous
two paragraphs give the result.
It is easy to verify that the sets SS, SS,WS,WS, A and I cover all types in [0 1]2
without intersecting each other. This finishes the description of equilibrium. We now prove
that there is indeed abstention in equilibrium; this is done by showing that →∅  ∅→
in equilibrium which is indeed the same condition for the setsWS, WS and A to be non
empty.
To prove that there is abstention in equilibrium, and hence the set of weak supporters
and abstainers are not empty we first prove the following Lemma
Lemma 4 Let  (;) =
b2−1cX
=0
(−1)!
!!(−1−−)! ();  (+1) () is increasing in .
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Proof. Using the definition of  (;) we have that
 (;  + 1)
 (; ) = (+ 1)
1 +
b2−1cX
=1
(−1)!
!(+1)!(−1−2)! ()
1 +
b2−1cX
=1
(−1)!
!!(−1−2)! ()
− 2
Taking derivatives with respect to  leads, after some algebra to

³ (;+1)
 (;)
´
 ≤
(+ 1)

⎛
⎜⎝
b2−1cX
=1
(−1)!
(−1)!(+1)!(−1−2)! ()
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝
b2−1cX
=1
(−1)!
!(+1)!(−1−2)! ( + 1) ()
⎞
⎟⎠
−
⎛
⎜⎝
b2−1cX
=1
(−1)!
!(+1)!(−1−2)! ()
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝
b2−1cX
=1
(−1)!
!(+1)!(−1−2)! ( + 1) ()
⎞
⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎝1 +
b2−1cX
=1
(−1)!
!!(−1−2)! ()
⎞
⎟⎠
2
so it is suﬃcient to prove the result that
0 ≥
b2−1cX
=1
b2−1cX
=1
(− 1)!
! ( + 1)! (− 1− 2)!
(− 1)!
! ( + 1)! (− 1− 2)! ( − )  ()
+ (31)
where we have replaced the index  for  appropriately. The result follows by observing that
2
b2−1cX
=1
b2−1cX
=1
(− 1)!
! ( + 1)! (− 1− 2)!
(− 1)!
! ( + 1)! (− 1− 2)! ( − )  ()
+
= −
b2−1cX
=1
b2−1cX
=
(− 1)!
! ( + 1)! (− 1− 2)!
(− 1)!
! ( + 1)! (− 1− 2)! ( − )
2 ()+
The next Corollary follows from the condition (13) and presents suﬃcient conditions from
abstention that are easier to check:
Corollary 1 There is abstention for some positive mass of types iﬀ
Pr ( | )
Pr ( | )  1 
Pr ( | )
Pr ( | ) (32)
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Proof. Let (1  2 ) ∈ 1 and we can define for  ∈ {1  2}
1 ()
(1− (1 + 2 ))−1
≡
b−12 cX
=0
(− 1)!
!! (− 1− 2)!
µ 1
(1− (1 + 2 ))
2
(1− (1 + 2 ))
¶
(33)
2 ( )
(1− (1 + 2 ))−1
≡ 
b2−1cX
=0
(− 1)!
! ( + 1)! (− 2 − 2)!
µ 1
(1− (1 + 2 ))
2
(1− (1 + 2 ))
¶
where bc is the biggest integer smaller than  ; note that 1 () only depends on the state
while 2 ( ) also depends on . Replacing 1 with Pr ( | ) and 2 with Pr ( | ) as
defined in (1), 1 () is the situation where  and  are tied in state  and 2 (Pr ( | )  )
(2 (Pr ( | )  )) is the probability that candidate  () has an advantage of 1 vote in
state  and we have that
Pr ( | ) = 2 (Pr ( | )  ) + 1 ()
2
(34)
Pr ( ∪  | ) = Pr ( | ) + 2 (Pr ( | )  ) + 1 ()
2
so →  ∅→ (see the discussion before condition (8)) is equivalent to
2 (Pr ( | )  )− 2 (Pr ( | )  )
1 () + 2 (Pr ( | )  ) 
2 (Pr ( | )  )− 2 (Pr ( | )  )
1 () + 2 (Pr ( | )  )
so it is suﬃcient if 2(Pr(|))2(Pr(|))  1  2(Pr(|))2(Pr(|)) . Using (33) we have that condition (32) is
equivalent to condition (13) and it is then necessary for abstention.
Now we need to prove that →  ∅→ is actually suﬃcient for abstention but this
was indeed proven when describing the set WS, WS, and A which are non empty when
→∅  ∅→.
Nowwe are ready to show that there is abstention. We are going to prove by contradiction
so assume that there is no endogenous abstention because →∅ ≤ ∅→. For any fixed  ,
Proposition 1 implies that only three sets of voters may be not empty: strong supporters
and independents so we only need the cutoﬀ functions ()=() () and ()=() () to
separate the set of types. The set of strong supporters is defined as
SS ≡ © ∈ [0 1]2 :  ≤ ()=() ()ª
SS ≡ © ∈ [0 1]2 :  ≥ ()=() ()ª
Using (2) and (3) and then definition of L () we have that
L ¡ ¡()=() ()  ¢¢ = ()=() ()× Pr ( ∪  | )
2
which implies that ()=() () is strictly convex and that ()=() (0) = ()=() (0).
Since (24) implies that ()=() () is strictly concave it follows that for any   0,
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()=() ()  ()=() (). Therefore, the union of the sets  strong supporters and
for  does not cover the whole set of types which implies that I 6= ∅ and there is information
acquisition in equilibrium. Since abstention is exogenous and the same in both states we
must have that
Pr ( | )  Pr ( | ) (35)
Pr ( | )  Pr ( | )
Since there is no endogenous abstention, Corollary 1 and (35), imply one of the next two
possibilities: 1) Pr(|)
Pr(|) ≤ 1, or 2) Pr(|)Pr(|) ≥ 1.
Case 1:
Since Pr(|)
Pr(|) ≤ 1 we have the following order of probabilities of voting for candidates
given the state
Pr ( | )  Pr ( | ) ≤ Pr ( | )  Pr ( | ) (36)
and also that
Pr ( | )
Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | ) 
Pr ( | )
Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | ) ≤
1
2
1
2
≤ Pr ( | )
Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | ) 
Pr ( | )
Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | )
since there is no endogenous abstention and abstention does not depend on the state. Note
that the function 1 () =  (1− ) is single peaked which implies that
1
µ
Pr ( | )
Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | )
¶
 1
µ
Pr ( | )
Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | )
¶
(37)
so we must have thatµ
Pr ( | )
(1− (Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | )))
Pr ( | )
(1− (Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | )))
¶
=
µ
1
µ
Pr ( | )
Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | )
¶¶µ
(Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | ))
(1− (Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | )))
¶2

µ
1
µ
Pr ( | )
Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | )
¶¶ µ
(Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | ))
(1− (Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | )))
¶2
where the second line follows because Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | ) = Pr ( | ) + Pr ( | ) =
1− +  ( + ), the third line follows by (37), and the last line follows since abstention
is constant across states (only partisan voters abstain). Using (33) from Proposition 3 with
Pr ( | ) instead of 1 and Pr ( | ) instead of 2 we must have that 1 ()  1 () and2 ( )  2 ( ).
Recalling Corollary 1 we have that is necessary and suﬃcient for abstention that the
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following inequality holds:
1 () + Pr ( | ) e2 ()
1 () + Pr ( | ) e2 ()  1 () + Pr ( | ) e2 ()1 () + Pr ( | ) e2 () (38)
where e2 ()
(1− (1 + 2 ))−1
=
2 ( )
(1− (1 + 2 ))−1
1

Note that we can manipulate the suﬃcient condition (38) to get Pr(|)−Pr(|)1()
2()+Pr(|)
 Pr(|)−Pr(|)1()
2()+Pr(|)or
1 ()e2 () (Pr ( | )− Pr ( | )) + Pr ( | ) Pr ( | )
 1 ()e2 () (Pr ( | )− Pr ( | )) + Pr ( | ) Pr ( | )
Recalling that 0  Pr ( | )−Pr ( | )  Pr ( | )−Pr ( | ) by (36), andPr ( | ) Pr ( | ) 
Pr ( | ) Pr ( | ) by the fact that there is information acquisition, if 1()2() ≥ 1()2() we have
that (38) hold.
Recalling the definition of  (;) in Lemma 4 we have that 

Pr(|) Pr(|)
(1−(Pr(|)+Pr(|)))2 ;+1



Pr(|) Pr(|)
(1−(Pr(|)+Pr(|)))2 ;
 =
2()
1() . Using the result in (37) we have that Lemma 4 gives that
2()
1()  2()1() since Pr(|)Pr(|)(1−(Pr(|)+Pr(|)))2 
Pr(|) Pr(|)
(1−(Pr(|)+Pr(|)))2 which leads to a contradiction and
Pr(|)
Pr(|) ≤ 1 is not possible.
Case 2:
The case Pr(|)
Pr(|) ≥ 1 uses that it must be that
Pr ( | )  Pr ( | ) ≤ Pr ( | )  Pr ( | ) (39)
and (37) implies that 1 ()  1 () and 2 ( )  2 ( ). Since (38) can be written as
Pr ( | )− Pr ( | )
1()
2() +Pr ( | )
 Pr ( | )− Pr ( | )1()
2() +Pr ( | )µ1 ()e2 () + Pr ( | )
¶
(Pr ( | )− Pr ( | )) 
µ1 ()e2 () + Pr ( | )
¶
(Pr ( | )− Pr ( | ))
and since Pr ( | ) − Pr ( | )  Pr ( | ) − Pr ( | ) ≥ 0 it is suﬃcient if 1()2()  1()2() .
Using again that


Pr(|) Pr(|)
(1−(Pr(|)+Pr(|)))2 ;+1



Pr(|) Pr(|)
(1−(Pr(|)+Pr(|)))2 ;
 = 2()1() , Lemma 4 gives that
2()
1()  2()1() since now
(37) and (39) implies that Pr(|)Pr(|)
(1−(Pr(|)+Pr(|)))2  Pr(|) Pr(|)(1−(Pr(|)+Pr(|)))2 .
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Proof of Proposition 3 Let  = (1−(+))
−1
2
and define the spaces
1 ≡ {( ) ∈ [ 1− (∅ + )]× [ 1− (∅ + )]}
2 () ≡ ©(   ) ∈ [ 1]2 × [ 1]2 : +  ≤   +  ≤ ª
Let (1  2 ) ∈ 1 be a generic element of the set 1 if we let  =  ( = ) so (1  2 )
plays the role of the probabilities a random non partisan voter supports  () in diﬀerent
states. Let
¡∅  ∅  ¢ by a generic element of the space 2 () so ∅ plays the role of
Pr ( | ) and  plays the role of Pr ( ∪  | ) for  ∈ { }.
Let  : [0 1]2×2 ()→ £12  1− ¤   = 1 2 3 be implicitly defined by 0 (1) = ∅+∅2 ,
 0 (2) = +
2
, and  0 (3) = (−∅)+(−∅)
2
, and let  be such that  0 (1− )  1.
So 1 plays the role of  ∅, 2 plays the role of  and 3 plays the role of ∅ as defined in
(11). Now consider an element
¡∅  ∅  ¢ ∈ 2 () and using (1 2 3), we can define
the cutoﬀ functions used in the characterization of equilibrium . Therefore, the sets of strong
and weak supporters, independents and abstainers are well defined. Using Proposition 1 we
have that  (), the probability of a vote for  ∈ {} in state  ∈ { }, is
Pr () ≡
Z
∈WS
1 ()  () +
Z
∈SS
 () +
Z
∈I
2 ()  () (40)
Pr () ≡
Z
∈WS
¡
1− 1 ()¢  () + Z
∈SS
 () +
Z
∈I
¡
1− 2 ()¢  ()
Pr () ≡
Z
∈WS
3 ()  () +
Z
∈SS
 () +
Z
∈I
2 ()  () (41)
Pr () ≡
Z
∈WS
¡
1− 3 ()¢  () + Z
∈SS
 () +
Z
∈I
¡
1− 2 ()¢  ()
For functions (1 2 3) and ¡∅  ∅  ¢ ∈ 2 () we define the functions  :2 ()→ 1 for  =  such that

¡∅  ∅  ¢ ≡ + (1− ) Pr ()

¡∅  ∅  ¢ ≡ + (1− ) Pr ()
Let (1  2 ) ∈ 1 and using (33) we have that 1 () is the situation where  and  are tied
in state  and 2 (1  ) (2 (2  )) is the probability that candidate  () has an advantage
of 1 vote in state . Recalling Pr ( | ) and Pr ( ∪  | ) we define the function
 : 1 × 1 → 2 () as 1 (1 2 1 2) = 2(

2 )+1()
2
and 2 (1 2 1 2) =
1 () + 2(

1 )+2(2 )
2
so 1 gives Pr ( | ) and 2 gives Pr ( ∪  | ).22
22Imagine that 2 (1 ) is the probability of a vote in favor of  () in state  and imagine a voter
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Now we have all the elements to show that an equilibrium actually exists. Take an
arbitrary element of S ≡ (1)2 × 2 (), define the function Γ : S → S such that Γ ≡©   1  2 ª, where the components are defined as above. We are going to
show first that actually Γ is a continuous function.
For continuity of
¡   ¢ we first observe that all the cutoﬀ functions that
determine the types (weak and strong supporters, abstainers and independents), are well
defined and continuous for
¡∅  ∅  ¢ and (1 2 3) as defined above. Therefore Pr ()
and Pr () are continuous on ¡∅  ∅  ¢ when we consider that (1 2 3) are also
continuous and well defined for ∅ ∈ [ 1],  ∈ [ 1]. The fact that  is continuous in
(1 2 1 2) follows trivially by continuity of 2 ( ) and 1 () in (1 2 1 2). 1 and2 () are convex and compact, so Brouwer’s fixed point theorem holds and there is some
 ∈ S such that Γ () = .
Proof of Proposition 2 Remark 1, Remark 2, and Remark 5 in the Appendix show that
for   0 but small, the cutoﬀ functions are ordered according to
()=(∅) ()  (∅)=(∅∅) ()  (∅)=(∅∅) ()  ()=(∅) ()
which gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 4 The first part follows by noting that Pr ( ∪  | ) → 0
when →∞. Using that no information is collected in the limit we have that Pr ( | ) =
Pr () and Pr ( | ) = Pr () which implies that inequality (32) in Corollary 1 does not
hold and abstention by non partisans voters has limit measure 0.
Proof of Lemma 3 Since the argument in Proposition 1 does not depend on the fact
that there is no endogenous abstention but just on (35) we have that Pr(|)
Pr(|)  1  Pr(|)Pr(|) .
Using now that in the limit almost no information is used and Pr ( | ) → Pr ( | ) and
Pr ( | )→ Pr ( | ) we have for suﬃciently large  it must be that 1 ≈ Pr(|)
Pr(|) so in the
limit
 +
Z
∈SS
 ()  ≈  +
Z
∈SS
 () 
which gives the result.
considering switching her vote from ∅ to . Then 1()2 is the increment in the probability of  winning
because a tie is broken and 2(

2 )
2 is increment in the probability of  winning because a tie is created.
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